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JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL CASES:
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 431-
A JOURNEY BACK TO THE FUTURE AND
WHAT IT PORTENDS
Judge Michael P. Toomin*
INTRODUCTION
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431 ("Rule 431") has significantly
broadened the attorney's role in the jury selection process by restor-
ing to counsel the right to personally question prospective jurors.'
Although the rule does not vest the prosecution or the defense with
unbridled discretion in the exercise of this resurrected power, it none-
theless affords counsel the opportunity to have personal contact with
the venire at the earliest stage of the trial.2 The rule, if used skillfully
by thoughtful and well-prepared counsel, should further the ability of
the parties to select jurors committed not only to fairness and imparti-
ality, but also possessed of an understanding of the issues to be de-
cided and the fundamental principles inherent in all criminal
prosecutions.
Part I of this article initially will focus upon the historical back-
ground of attorney conducted voir dire to highlight the rather diver-
gent views that have influenced its development.3 Part II will analyze
Rule 431 in terms of the impact it will have in the jury selection pro-
cess, touching upon some problematic areas likely to be visited by trial
judges and, in turn, the courts of review.4 Finally in Part III, the au-
thor shall endeavor to articulate some practical suggestions to counsel
in conducting voir dire, touching on procedural considerations as well
* Judge Toomin is a Supervising Judge in the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Northwestern University in 1962 and a
Juris Doctor degree from DePaul University College of Law in 1967. Judge Toomin has been a
member of the judiciary since 1980, and has served as an Adjunct Professor of Law at North-
western University School of Law for the past 16 years. He is also a member of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules Criminal Subcommittee and participated in the drafting of portions of the
new rule.
1. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 431 (West 1998).
2. Id.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
as areas of permissible inquiry. 5 These suggestions hopefully will be
of some assistance to attorneys who may not have had any meaningful
opportunity to personally question prospective jurors.
I. THE LONG MARCH - OR BACK TO THE FUTURE
Although many members of the trial bar, especially younger practi-
tioners, may view their broadened power as a justified entitlement,
others may validly perceive the change more as a long-overdue return
to yesterday. Historically, the voir dire examination of prospective ju-
rors has been regarded as a significant aspect of trial procedure, hav-
ing the two-fold purpose of enabling counsel to challenge for cause, if
cause exists, or to exercise peremptory challenges where deemed ap-
propriate. 6 The primary objective is to insure the selection of a juror
who will be impartial to the parties 7 who will be, as Lord Coke ob-
served, a "liber homo ...that hath such freedome of mind as he
stands indifferent as he stands unsworne."'8 To achieve this goal, it has
long been the custom in this state to allow counsel "to make any rea-
sonable and pertinent search to ascertain whether the minds of pro-
spective jurors are free from bias and prejudice," 9 a practice earlier
courts viewed as inherent in the right to a fair and impartial trial.10
Although the conduct of the voir dire understandably was vested in
the trial judge and subject to reasonable limitation, in Donovan v.
People the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the right of chal-
lenge was so highly cherished that inferior courts were not authorized
to prescribe rules which rendered it unavailing." In Donovan, the
trial judge had curtailed defense counsel's participation, announcing,
"except as you examine the jurors for cause through the mouth of the
court, you can not examine them at all."'1 2 In reversing the trial court,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Michigan rule enunciated in
Stephens v. People,'3 holding that the right to examine jurors was in-
deed personal to counsel.' 4
Early in this century, the almost universal practice was to allow
counsel to conduct the entire examination of the venire.' 5 That exam-
5. See infra Part III.
6. Donovan v. People, 28 N.E. 964, 965 (Ill. 1891).
7. Coughlin v. People, 33 N.E. 1, 8 (II1. 1893).
8. EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *155.a. (1630).
9. People v. Murawski, 117 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Il1. 1954).
10. See, e.g., Lavin v. People, 69 I11. 303, 304 (1873).
11. Donovan, 28 N.E. at 965.
12. Id.
13. 38 Mich. 739, 741 (1878).
14. Donovan, 28 N.E. at 965.
15. People v. Brumfield, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (I11. App. Ct. 1977).
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ination was not limited to factual inquiries alone, for counsel had the
right to advise the prospective jurors generally about the law of the
case and to conduct a reasonable examination of the jurors on that
subject.16 This was particularly true in criminal cases where specific
inquiry was routinely made by both court and counsel as to whether
the juror understood and accepted fundamental propositions such as:
that the grand jury was simply an accusatory body;17 that the indict-
ment it voted was merely a formality necessary to place the defendant
on trial;18 that the accused was cloaked with the presumption of inno-
cence which remained throughout the trial, unless and until the juror
was convinced that the defendant had been proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt;19 that the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
was on the state and the defendant need not prove his innocence;20
and finally, that should the defendant elect not to testify, his cause
could not be prejudiced, but should he choose to take the stand he
was entitled to be heard as well.2'
Although these inquiries clearly were defense oriented, the right to
examine as to matters of law was not limited to the defendant alone.
The State also enjoyed this right, and prosecutors could avail them-
selves of the opportunity to make appropriate inquiries as a matter of
general practice. Thus, prosecutors routinely asked venire members
such questions as whether they maintained "conscientious scruples"
against capital punishment;22 whether they would reject the death
penalty where guilt rested upon circumstantial evidence; 23 and
whether they would refuse to convict upon the belief that the punish-
ment was too severe.24
As the volume of litigation increased, concerns over abuses per-
ceived to result from attorney conducted voir dire took hold.25 These
concerns heralded a call to judicial control which, in turn, was an-
swered by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges of the United
States. In October 1924, that body recommended that the examina-
tion of prospective jurors be by the court alone, with counsel given the
16. People v. Kestian, 167 N.E. 786, 788 (I11. 1929).
17. Coughlin v. People, 33 N.E. 1, 4 (Ill. 1893).
18. Id.
19. People v. Redola, 133 N.E. 292, 293 (Ill. 1921).
20. Coughlin, 33 N.E. at 5.
21. Id.
22. People v. Winchester, 185 N.E. 580, 582 (Ill. 1933).
23. Gates v. People, 14 I11. 433, 434-35 (1853).
24. Id.
25. Willis B. Perkins, Some Needed Reforms in the Methods of Selecting Juries, 13 MICH. L.
REV. 391, 393-94 (1915).
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opportunity to recommend additional areas of inquiry to the court.26
This recommendation was followed by a number of federal district
courts,27 and eventually upheld in Falter v. United States,28 where
Judge Learned Hand noted: "while it was the custom at common law
to allow the parties to cross-examine, there is nothing in this essential
to securing a panel free from bias. The length and particularity of the
examination of jurors had become a scandal, and required some effec-
tive control. ' 29 With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938, court conducted voir dire became the recognized
practice of selecting juries in the United States District Courts.30
Similar misgivings arose in Illinois, finding early expression in the
case of Mithen v. Jeffery.31 There, complaint was made that the "inter-
minable examination of jurors, so often made as to different individu-
als and every conceivable relation to them, should not be indulged
in."'32 Thus began a movement to adopt a uniform procedure of court
control designed to shorten the voir dire examination and to confine it
to its true purpose. Proponents looked approvingly at the Federal
Rules which had proved remarkably successful in reducing the time
consumed by jury selection, as well as to a number of commentaries
that had addressed what was perceived as a distortion of the voir dire
process.33
These concerns were the impetus for a report emanating from the
1958 Illinois Judicial Conference considering the idea that trial judges
be vested with the authority to conduct the voir dire examination, with
counsel being permitted a reasonable opportunity to supplement such
26. Recommendations of Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 10 A.B.A. J. 875, 875
(1924).
27. Kurczak v. United States, 14 F.2d 109, 110 (6th Cir. 1926); Bradshaw v. United States, 15
F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1926); Murphy v. United States, 7 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 1925); Ungerleider
v. United States, 5 F.2d 604, 605 (4th Cir. 1925).
28. 23 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1928).
29. Id. at 426.
30. Rule 47(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as originally adopted, provided:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of pro-
spective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court
shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such fur-
ther inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
31. 102 N.E. 778 (I11. 1913).
32. Id. at 780; see also Pennsylvania Co. v. Rudel, 100 Il. 603 (1881), where the court stated:
"The unnecessary protraction of jury trials has come to be a great evil, and one thing which
contributes thereto is the needlessly long drawn out examination of jurors." Id. at 608.
33. See Roger D. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, 17 GEO. L.J. 13, 37-38 (1928);
Frank G. Swain, Common Sense in Jury Trials, 30 J. ST. B. CAL. 405, 406-07 (1955); Selection of
Jurors by Voir Dire Examination and Challenge, 58 YALE L.J. 638, 640 (1949).
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examination.34 The recommendation, in the format of a proposed
rule, was based upon the report of the Committee on Limitation of
Voir Dire Examination, which noted in its preamble: "Judges,
throughout the State, faced with an ever expanding volume of litiga-
tion and in some sections scandalous delays, are increasingly con-
cerned with the disposition on the part of trial counsel to prolong
inordinately the voir dire examination .... 35
Among the evils noted was the practice of indulging in tedious and
repetitious examinations and propounding long rhetorical questions
designed to ingratiate the lawyer with the jury rather than to elicit
information. Equally objectionable were counsel's tiresome state-
ments outlining the law, and the inquisitor's philosophy and ideas on
various subjects, as well as his notion concerning the thought
processes to be followed by jurors. 36 The report was especially critical
of the procedure of examining jurors concerning questions of law.
Although the committee was mindful of the Illinois Supreme Court's
earlier pronouncements that criminal defendants had the right to ad-
vise jurors concerning the law of the case, 37 it noted that those cases
were decided at a time when jurors were considered to be judges of
the law as well as the facts. 38 It was the view of the committee that
such examinations were "without question one of the most pernicious
practices indulged in by many attorneys. ' 39 The usual procedure, as
the committee noted, was to orally expound upon legal propositions
that were "slanted, argumentative and often so clearly erroneous as to
cause certain reversal if given by the court."' 4" The report further la-
mented that when an attorney is allowed to give his version of the law
to the jury, his opponent is certain to retaliate by giving his version of
the law, the inevitable result being that the court is required, in set-
tling the dispute, to give oral instructions on questions of law that may
not eventually be relevant to the jury's inquiry.41
34. 1958 Illinois Judicial Conference, Executive Committee Annual Report 92. The members
of the Committee on Limitation of Voir Dire Examination were Judge Alan E. Ashcraft, Chair-
man; Judge Robert E. English; Judge Henry J. Ingram; Judge Thomas E. Kluczynski; Judge Win.
C. Radliff; and Judge Roy J. Solfisburg.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. People v. Kestian, 167 N.E. 786, 788 (I11. 929); People v. Redola, 133 N.E. 292, 293 (Ill.
1921).
38. Illinois Judicial Conference, supra note 34, at 97.
39. Id. at 96.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 97.
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The Illinois Supreme Court acted upon the committee's recommen-
dations in Rule 24-1.42 Promulgated on September 17, 1958, the Rule
provided:
The judge shall initiate the voir dire examination of jurors in civil
and criminal causes by identifying the parties and their respective
counsel and he shall briefly outline the nature of the case. Thejudge shall then put to the jurors any questions which he thinks nec-
essary, touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause
on trial. The parties or their attorneys shall be allowed a reasonable
opportunity to supplement such examination, but shall not directly
or indirectly examine jurors concerning matters of law or
instructions.43
As apparent from its language, the Rule significantly changed the
landscape of jury selection within the state. First and foremost, the
trial juge was empowered not only to initiate the voir dire by identify-
ing the parties, counsel, and the nature of the case, but also to put to
the jurors any questions believed necessary.44 Although the parties or
their attorneys were afforded a reasonable opportunity to supplement
the judge's examination, the use of the word "supplement" was meant
to indicate that counsel's examination should complement rather than
repeat the judge's examination. 45 The prohibition as to matters of law
was viewed by the drafters as "a most important element" of Rule 24-
1.46 The drafters envisioned that the prohibition would end the prac-
tice of lawyers who, under the guise of eliciting information, at-
tempted to impart to the jurors a conception of the law highly
favorable to their side of the case. 47
The ink was hardly dry before the constitutionality of Rule 24-1 was
brought before the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lobb.48 The
issue was framed in terms of whether the rule was consistent with the
constitutional mandate that guaranteed the right of trial by jury "as
heretofore enjoyed. '49
Faced with this challenge to its own rule-making power, the court
did not do the unexpected. In upholding Rule 24-1, the Lobb court
reaffirmed earlier pronouncements that the only legitimate purpose of
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110/101.24-1 (West 1959).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Letter from the Drafting Committee of the Judicial Conference to the Illinois Supreme
Court (Sept. 15, 1958); see SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. ch. 110A, T 234 (West 1985).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 161 N.E.2d 325 (I11. 959).
49. Id. at 333-34; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 5.
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the voir dire examination was to secure an impartial jury.50 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that the "guarantee of trial by jury is not so
inelastic as to render unchangeable every characteristic and specifica-
tion of the common-law jury system."'51 The court specifically noted
that at common law, the right of trial by jury meant the right to have
the facts in controversy determined, under the direction and superin-
tendence of a judge, by the unanimous verdict of twelve impartial ju-
rors who possessed the qualifications and were selected in the manner
prescribed by law.52 The court, however, found nothing in the consti-
tutional guarantee that prevented "reasonable regulation of the man-
ner in which jurors shall be selected."' 53
In substance, Rule 24-1 continued to govern jury selection in both
civil and criminal cases for the next 16 years. In 1967, the Illinois
Supreme Court revised the numbering nomenclature of the Rules
with the result that Rule 24-1 was redesignated Rule 234. 54 At the
same time, the court adopted Rule 411, which provided that voir dire
in criminal cases was to be conducted in accordance with Rule 234.55
Then, in 1971, Rule 411 was renumbered Rule 431, again providing
that voir dire in criminal cases would be conducted in accordance with
Rule 234.56
Although implementation of these rules resulted in some improve-
ment, Rule 234, by and large, failed to speed up the process of jury
selection or remedy the other problems it was supposed to solve.57
Dissatisfaction in the judicial quarter became the impetus for renewed
inquiry into the efficacy of voir dire procedures. 58 In turn, a commit-
tee of the 1974 Illinois Judicial Conference found that "tedious, pro-
longed voir dire examinations still plagued the courts while the
caseload increased at a rate four times faster than the population. '59
Realization of these concerns led to a recommendation by the Con-
ference that Rule 234 be amended to vest the trial judge with exclu-
sive control over the conduct of the voir dire, with permissive
participation by counsel at the court's discretion.60 The Illinois
50. Lobb, 161 N.E.2d at 333.
51. Id. at 332.
52. Id. at 331.
53. Id. at 333.
54. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A1234 (West 1967).
55. Id. ch. 110AJ411.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A/431 (West 1971).
57. People v. Brumfield, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (I11. App. Ct. 1977).
58. Id.
59. Illinois Judicial Conference, 1974 Report of the Study Committee on Jury Selection and
Utilization 132, 140.
60. Id. at 136-37.
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Supreme Court adopted that recommendation, effective July 1, 1975,
with the result that Rule 234 was amended as follows:
The court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective ju-
rors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate touching
their qualifications to serve as jurors in the case on trial. The court
may permit the parties to submit additional questions to it for fur-
ther inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate, or may permit the par-
ties to supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as the
court deems proper. Questions shall not directly or indirectly con-
cern matters of law or instructions. 61
Legislative reaction to the curtailment of counsel's right to directly
participate in the voir dire followed quickly on the heels of the amend-
ment. In September 1975, the General Assembly amended Section
115-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing in subparagraph
(f) that each opposing counsel have the right to personally examine
prospective jurors for the purpose of determining each juror's qualifi-
cations, biases and prejudices, or freedom therefrom. 62 The judicial
response was predictable, with courts in several appellate districts
finding that the enactment unduly infringed upon the judicial power
of the courts, and the section was therefore invalid.63 An identical
result obtained in People v. Jackson,64 when the issue was addressed
by the Illinois Supreme Court, with the court holding that Section 115-
4(f) indeed constituted a legislative infringement upon the powers of
the judiciary and was therefore void. 65 In Jackson, the court also re-
jected the claim that examination of prospective jurors by either the
court or counsel was part and parcel of the right to trial by jury, reaf-
firming the principle that the voir dire was rather a matter of trial
detail which courts indeed could regulate. 66
The most recent amendments to the rules governing voir dire exam-
ination have their genesis in a 1989 report prepared by the Illinois
Supreme Court Committee on Implementation of Jury Standards, 67
and from a 1996 proposal of the Criminal Rules Subcommittee. 68
Although both committees advocated permissive attorney voir dire,
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA/234 (West 1975).
62. Id. ch. 38/115-4(f).
63. Brumfield, 366 N.E.2d at 1137; People v. Thornton, 369 N.E.2d 358, 361 (I1. App. Ct.
1977).
64. 371 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1977).
65. Id. at 606.
66. Id.
67. Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Implementation of Jury Standards, Illinois Stan-
dards Relating to Juror Use and Management 8 (June 5, 1989).
68. Report of the Criminal Rules Subcommittee to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Commit-
tee 1 (Apr. 26, 1996). The author of this article served on this subcommittee from 1989-1991,
and again from 1995 to present.
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the Supreme Court Rules Committee later approved a proposal al-
lowing counsel to directly participate in the examination of jurors,
subject to limitations based on the length and complexity of the case. 69
The Criminal Rules Subcommittee recognized that some criminal
court judges, including this author, were allowing attorney voir dire
and others were not. The subcommittee decided to leave the question
of attorney participation to the discretion of the trial judge depending
upon the facts and circumstances of the case.70 The subcommittee's
primary focus was upon seeking compliance with the requirement es-
tablished in People v. Zehr that prospective jurors be examined con-
cerning their understanding and acceptance of fundamental principles,
such as the presumption of innocence and the standard and burden of
proof in criminal cases.71 Both proposals were placed on the public
hearing agenda of the full Rules Committee on January 27, 1997 and
thereafter were recommended for adoption.72 The Illinois Supreme
Court concurred in that recommendation and effective May 1, 1997,
Rule 431 was amended. Rule 431(a) provides:
The court shall conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors
by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate, touching upon
their qualifications to serve as jurors in the case at trial. The court
may permit the parties to submit additional questions to it for fur-
ther inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate and shall permit the
parties to supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as the
court deems proper for a reasonable period of time depending upon
the length of examination by the court, the complexity of the case,
and the nature of the charges. Questions shall not directly or indi-
rectly concern matters of law or instructions. The court shall ac-
quaint prospective jurors with the general duties and responsibilities
of jurors. 73
Analyzing the rule in terms of its essential components, the trial
court continues to be vested with the overall conduct of the voir dire
by examining jurors as to their basic qualifications. Permissive inquiry
is then afforded to counsel to submit additional questions for the court
to ask if it believes them to be appropriate. Both of these provisions
69. Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 1996).
70. Report of the Criminal Rules Subcommittee, supra note 68, Attach. A.
71. Id; People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1063-64 (I11. 1984). In Zehr, the court reversed
defendant's convictions of home invasion, burglary, and aggravated battery. Id. at 1065. It held
that the trial court's refusal to ask questions submitted by the defense in its voir dire examina-
tion resulted in prejudicial error. Id. at 1064. The court reasoned that jurors must be made
aware of a defendant's basic guarantees prior to their qualification, for an instruction about
these guarantees at the end of trial would do little to ensure these rights. Id.
72. Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee, Recommendations to the Supreme Court of
Illinois 3-4 (Mar. 1997).
73. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 431(a) (West 1998).
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were contained in former Rule 234 and represent no change from the
former practice.74 Supplemental direct inquiry by counsel is man-
dated to the extent the court deems proper, limited to a reasonable
period of time depending upon the length of the court's examination,
the complexity of the case, and the nature of the charges.75 This pro-
vision is entirely new, and as viewed in its evolutionary context, repre-
sents a return back to the future. Rule 431 also continues the
proscription against inquiring directly or indirectly as to matters of
law or instructions,76 a position that has not been uniformly followed.
Lastly, the court is directed to acquaint prospective jurors with their
general duties and responsibilities. 77 This last grant of authority was
given in 1983,78 and although the rule provides no guidance to judges
in fulfilling this requirement, it does not represent a significant
change. Recognizing that the vast majority of trial judges traditionally
have addressed the subject in their opening remarks to the venire, it is
likely that they would continue the practice even in the absence of the
Rule's mandate.
Rule 431(b) provides:
If requested by the defendant, the court shall ask each potential ju-
ror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and
accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed
innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a de-
fendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to
offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defend-
ant's failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however,
no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant's
failure to testify when the defendant objects. The court's method of
inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to spe-
cific questions concerning the principles set out in this section. 79
This provision is new and is intended to ensure compliance with the
requirements of Zehr.80 As the Committee Comment reflects, this
74. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
75. ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 431(a).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A/234 (1983).
79. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 431(b) (West 1998).
80. People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ill. 1984). In Zehr, the supplemental questions
tendered by the defendant were:
1. If at the close of all the evidence and after you have heard arguments of counsel you
believe that the State has failed to sustain the burden of proof and has failed to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would you have any hesitation what-
soever in returning a verdict of Not Guilty? 2. If the defendant ... decides not to
testify in his own behalf, would you hold it against him? 3. Do you understand that the
[Vol. 48:83
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provision "seeks to end the practice where the judge makes a broad
statement of the applicable law followed by a general question con-
cerning the juror's willingness to follow the law." '81 Interestingly, the
proposal originating in the Criminal Rules Subcommittee mandated
the trial judge to ask each potential juror, individually or in a group,
each of the pertinent Zehr inquiries.82 Moreover, the Rules Commit-
tee concurred in this approach in its recommendation to the Illinois
Supreme Court, 83 presumably of the opinion that by requiring the trial
court to ask the appropriate questions, Zehr's mandate would be satis-
fied. The Supreme Court, however, modified the proposal with the
result that the rule is permissive; the Zehr questions are required only
where they are requested by the defense.8 4
Rule 431(b) further provides that when the defendant objects, "no
inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant's fail-
ure to testify .... "85 Both the Criminal Rules Subcommittee,86 and
the Rules Committee,87 included this provision in their recommenda-
tions. The limitation, moreover, mirrors the view of the Illinois
Supreme Court directing that the jury instruction which cautions ju-
rors that the defendant's failure to testify must not be held against him
is only to be given at the request of the accused. 88
II. PROBLEM AREAS LIKELY TO BE VISITED
Recognizing that Rule 431 has been in force for a relatively short
period of time, there are no reported cases construing or interpreting
its provisions. Nonetheless, based upon what has been experienced by
some trial judges to date, coupled with observations from earlier prac-
tices, there are problem areas that predictably will be visited. Antici-
pating some potential areas of concern, attention will first focus upon
Rule 431(b) and its announced purpose, to ensure compliance with
Zehr's mandate. As noted, because the language adopted by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court is clearly permissive, a legitimate question which
may arise is whether the result intended will be realized. What posi-
defendant is presumed innocent and does not have to offer any evidence in his own
behalf, but must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the State?
Id.
81. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 431(b) (committee comment).
82. See Report of the Criminal Rules Subcommittee, supra note 68.
83. See Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee, supra note 72, at 3-4.
84. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 431(b).
85. Id.
86. See Report of Criminal Rules Subcommittee, supra note 68.
87. See Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee, supra note 72.
88. ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS, Criminal, 2.04 (3d ed. 1992).
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tion is the trial judge to take when, if because of design, inadvertence
or ignorance, defense counsel fails to pose or fails to request that the
judge ask the pertinent Zehr questions to prospective jurors? Should
such a result obtain, it not only would render the objective of the rule
illusory, but would also conflict with Zehr's avowed purpose. As Zehr
and its progeny dictate, jurors in a criminal case must be aware that a
defendant is presumed innocent, that he is not required to present
evidence, that the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the defendant's failure to testify cannot be used
against him.89 Such knowledge, as Zehr proclaims, is essential to the
qualification of jurors in a criminal case. 90 Yet, there is no assurance
that this requisite degree of awareness will be manifested where the
inquiry is left solely to the discretion of defense counsel.
One might also conjecture as to how the reviewing courts will ap-
praise claims of attorney incompetence which may follow in the wake
of trial counsel's failure to make the appropriate Zehr inquiries.
Under the prevailing Strickland v. Washington9' standard, will the
courts of review conclude that counsel's performance in this regard
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness? Or will they likely
reason that but for such deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that a different result would have followed? 92 Had the Illi-
nois Supreme Court chosen to adopt the position of the drafting com-
mittee that the trial judge bear the onus of ensuring Zehr's
compliance, this inquiry and resulting conjecture would be unneces-
sary. What is apparent is that the court might have better accom-
89. People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d, 1062, 1064 (I11. 1984); see also People v. Emerson, 522 N.E.2d
1109, 1114 (Il. 1987) (holding that there is no precise formula for the court to follow in ascer-
taining jurors' attitudes and that the trial judge satisfied the Zehr requirements when he made a
general admonition to the jury and later discussed the presumption of innocence with them);
People v. Carson, 606 N.E.2d 363, 371 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no error when the trial court
admonished the jury, on four separate occassions, of the Zehr standards to which they must
adhere); People v. Dale, 545 N.E.2d 521, 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding substantial compliance
with Zehr where prospective jurors were instructed as a group as to defendant's right not to
testify and were asked individually whether they would follow the law); People v. Starks, 523
N.E.2d 983, 988-91 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (finding prejudicial and reversible error when the trial
court failed to pose to the venire on voir dire, or otherwise broach the subject matter sufficiently,
to secure prospective jurors' responses to questions tendered by defendant that addressed the
Zehr concerns).
90. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d at 1064.
91. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) ("[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of rea-
sonably effective assistance.").
92. See, e.g., People v. Stack, 470 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to ask prospective jurors questions submitted by the de-
fendant concerning any biases or prejudices with respect to the insanity defense, where the court
could not with certainty conclude that the verdict would not have changed had the tendered
questions on insanity been asked on voir dire).
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plished its avowed purpose by vesting trial judges with the
responsibility of ensuring that Zehr inquiries be made rather than
leaving this to the discretion of defense counsel.
Another area of potential controversy is likely to stem from the
rule's continued prohibition against inquiry concerning matters of law
or instructions.93 Although the origin and rationale of this prohibition
are now apparent to the reader, it is a proscription that is so riddled
and plagued by exceptions that one might well conclude that it has
been honored more in its breach than in its observance. A starting
point in this regard again is Zehr, where the State unsuccessfully ar-
gued that the trial court had correctly refused to ask the tendered
questions because they pertained to matters of law or instructions. 94
The incongruity of the result was clearly recognized by the dissent,
observing that while the trial court clearly was precluded by Rule 234
from entertaining the questions tendered, the majority nonetheless
concluded that the judge erred by conducting the voir dire examina-
tion in the very manner provided by the rule. 95
Notably, in addition to the traditional Zehr inquiries, the courts of
review have countenanced inquiry into matters of law on a garden
variety of subjects. Even before the advent of Rule 24-1, counsel was
allowed to probe a prospective juror's views on abortion, the rationale
being that abortion was a "particularly fertile field for preconceived
notions and prejudices. '96 Moreover, since the proscription was im-
posed, the appellate process has upheld the right to ascertain whether
jurors are opposed to capital punishment 97 or whether they favor the
death penalty in all murder cases;98 whether jurors could follow the
law of accountability in cases where the evidence failed to reveal that
the defendant actually did the shooting;99 and whether they could find
a defendant guilty without requiring that the State produce the vic-
tim's body.100 Questions concerning jurors' views on the insanity de-
fense have been determined to be an appropriate area of inquiry'01
given the court's recognition that laypersons may regard the defense
93. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 431(a) (West 1998).
94. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d at 1066.
95. Id. at 1066 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting).
96. People v. Murawski, 117 N.E.2d 88, 90 (I11. 1954).
97. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1985); People v. Ganus, 594 N.E.2d 211,
215 (Ill. 1992); People v. Steidl, 568 N.E.2d 837, 853-54 (111. 1991).
98. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738-39 (1992).
99. People v. Davis, 447 N.E.2d 353, 361 (Ill. 1983); People v. Johnson, 659 N.E.2d 22, 24 (111.
App. Ct. 1995).
100. People v. Faulkner, 542 N.E.2d 1190, 1198-99 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
101. People v. Stack, 493 N.E.2d 339, 344-45 (Il1. 1986).
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with some suspicion.102 Additionally, inquiry to ascertain whether ju-
rors entertain a bias against the intoxication defense has been up-
held, 103 as well as counsel's right to determine whether they would be
able to follow the law regulating obscenity. 10 4
Curiously, over the same period our reviewing courts have rejected
similar types of inquiry in other law related areas, reasoning that voir
dire questioning may not be used as a means of indoctrinating a jury
to a particular theory or defense 10 5 or impaneling a jury with a partic-
ular predisposition. 10 6 Under this rationale, the courts have found no
error in the trial judge's refusal to ask a juror's views on fetal life and
abortion in a prosecution for intentional homicide of an unborn
child;107 whether the defendant's mere presence at the crime scene
would create a presumption of guilt in a case involving the doctrine of
accountability;' 0 8 the jurors' viewpoints as to the defense of compul-
sion; 109 or their experiences regarding mistaken identity.1 0 In a
number of cases, the defendant's right to question jurors regarding
their attitudes about self-defense has also been rejected, the rationale
being that justifiable use of force touches upon a matter of law'1 ' and
does not qualify as a controversial defense." 2 Additionally, in capital
murder prosecutions the courts have found no error in refusing to in-
form the jurors of the range of possible imprisonment to which the
defendant might be sentenced if he were not sentenced to death, 113 or
102. People v. Cloutier, 622 N.E.2d 774, 781 (I11. 1993); see also Stack, 493 N.E.2d at 344
("Although the insanity defense upon which the defendant relied is a well-recognized legal de-
fense, it remains a subject of intense controversy.").
103. People v. Lanter, 595 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
104. People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 1154, 1159-60 (Il. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that
defense counsel's question was designed primarily to indoctrinate the jury into believing that the
legislature should not be regulating obscenity, and therefore was improper, whereas prosecu-
tion's question was designed to determine whether a prospective juror would be able to follow
the law).
105. People v. Chamness, 473 N.E.2d 476, 478 (I11. App. Ct. 1984); People v. Teague, 439
N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (I11. App. Ct. 1982).
106. People v. Bowel, 488 N.E.2d 995, 998 (I11. 1986).
107. People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85, 91 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
108. People v. Nunn, 541 N.E.2d 182, 195-96 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
109. People v. Phillips, 425 N.E.2d 1040, 1045-46 (I11. App. Ct. 1981); People v. Byer, 394
N.E.2d 632, 641 (I11. App. Ct. 1979).
110. Bowel, 488 N.E.2d at 998-99. In Bowel, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the reason-
ing earlier expressed in People v. Witted, 398 N.E.2d 68 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979), where the court
found "no basis for assuming that a person may harbor a bias or prejudice toward the essentially
innocuous defense of mistaken identity." Id. at 76.
111. People v. Kindelan, 502 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (I11. App. Ct. 1986); People v. Muhammad,
478 N.E.2d 457, 461 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
112. People v. Skipper, 533 N.E.2d 44, 46 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Kendricks, 459 N.E.2d
1137, 1142 (I11. App. Ct. 1984).
113. People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 282 (I11. 1990).
JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
by not allowing questioning concerning any preconceived opinions
they might have regarding parole laws and the defendant's eventual
release.1 14 The appellate court has also upheld the refusal to allow
defense inquiry concerning jurors' views where the evidence was en-
tirely circumstantial in nature. 115
The litany of decisions that demonstrate adherence to or rejection
of the prohibition against inquiry as to matters of law serves to under-
mine the guarantee of a fair and impartial jury and is unsettling to
both trial judges and counsel. It must be assumed that the Illinois
Supreme Court was aware of these conflicting opinions, but nonethe-
less chose to ignore the realities of the situation. Whatever the rea-
son, it is apparent that the proscriptions of the rule clash with well-
reasoned and controlling precedent. A more realistic approach would
have been to delete the prohibition against examining jurors concern-
ing matters of law and to allow such inquiry where the trial court
deems it appropriate in light of the issues to be resolved and the par-
ticular circumstances of the case. This approach, moreover, would be
consistent with the practices of many trial judges who permit inquiry
into matters of law in instances where, while there may be no legal
entitlement, there is no express prohibition.
Rulings governing inquiry into factual matters involved in criminal
prosecutions are equally conflicting and will inevitably provide yet an-
other area of foreseeable concern. Rule 431 places no limitation upon
such inquiry, nor could it do so without defeating the purpose of the
voir dire examination. Nonetheless, decisions addressing the scope of
factual inquiry are as varied as those touching upon questions of law.
For example, the courts have ruled that it is proper for defense coun-
sel to ask prospective jurors to relate their experiences as crime vic-
tims and the effect they might have upon them if selected as jurors,116
whether they would be more likely to believe the testimony of a police
officer simply because of his status or occupation,11 7 and whether the
defendant's gang affiliation would affect the jurors' ability to be
fair.1 18 Also, in cases involving extensive press coverage, it is incum-
bent upon the trial court to conduct a meaningful examination to de-
termine whether media reports have created a disposition in the
114. People v. Thomas, 561 N.E.2d 57, 77-78 (Ill. 1990).
115. People v. McMullin, 486 N.E.2d 412, 417 (II. App. Ct. 1985).
116. People v. Oliver, 637 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
117. People v. Taylor, 601 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
118. People v. Jimenez, 672 N.E.2d 914, 917 (11. App. Ct. 1996). However, in the absence of a
specific request, the trial judge is under no obligation to inquire as to a prospective juror's gang
bias. People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d 723, 730 (I11. App. Ct. 1998).
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
minds of the jurors 1 9 that they would be unable to lay aside.120 And,
defense counsel may also be entitled to question jurors regarding ra-
cial prejudice if "special circumstances" exist suggesting a "constitu-
tionally significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect a
defendant's trial.' 121 Likewise, the prosecution may properly inquire
as to whether any jurors would be unable to be fair and impartial be-
cause witnesses are involved in interracial relationships.122 However,
where racial overtones are absent, the defense has no right to ask
whether the jurors believe that blacks are more likely than whites to
commit crimes or otherwise probe for racial animosities.1 23
Questions that address the credibility of certain types of witnesses
may or may not be proper. For instance, in a case involving conversa-
tions which occurred in a correctional center, the prosecution could
properly ask whether prospective jurors would automatically disbe-
lieve a person because he was incarcerated. 124 Conversely, where the
evidence will not necessarily reveal the criminal background of the
principal witnesses, a defendant has no right to ask the jurors whether
they would be prejudiced against him because of his prior felony con-
victions.125 Likewise, in cases involving sexual abuse of children, the
defense has no right to ask whether the jurors "would find children to
be more believable and sympathetic witnesses than adults."'1 26 So too,
in a case where the victims were nuns, the court could properly refuse
any inquiry as to whether the jurors would avoid giving greater credi-
bility to the testimony of a nun than of any ordinary citizen. 127 Nor
does a defendant have the right to ask jurors whether they would re-
119. People v. Santamaria, 519 N.E.2d 1, 5 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
120. People v. Taylor, 462 N.E.2d 478, 484 (Ill. 1984). In Taylor, the court relied upon Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961), which stated: "[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Id. As to
the nature of the inquiry there is no requirement that the specific content of what the juror has
read or heard be asked. People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1182 (I11. 1984).
121. People v. Peeples, 616 N.E.2d 294, 311 (I11. 1993). Special circumstances exist where
"racial issues are 'inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.'" Id. at 311 (quoting
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1976)). "The sole fact that the defendant is black and the
victim is white 'does not constitute a "special circumstance" of constitutional proportions."' Id.
(quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986)). See, e.g., People v. Watson, 635 N.E.2d 795,
800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). However, in capital cases a defendant "accused of an interracial crime is
entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue
of racial bias." Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37 (1986).
122. People v. Clark, 664 N.E.2d 146, 152 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
123. People v. Fort, 618 N.E.2d 445, 454 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
124. People v. Smith, 610 N.E.2d 91, 102 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
125. People v. Brandon, 510 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
126. People v. Cemond, 612 N.E.2d 1, 3 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
127. People v. Dallas, 405 N.E.2d 1202, 1210-11 (111. App. Ct. 1980).
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gard his alibi witnesses as less credible because they were members of
his family. 128
The reviewing courts have also rejected the claim that in a prosecu-
tion for murder and attempted armed robbery, the defendant is enti-
tled to ask prospective jurors if they have any strong feelings about
handguns that would affect their decisions.129 Similarly, where the de-
fendant was charged with aggravated battery, he had no right to ask
the jurors whether evidence of serious physical injuries would hamper
their consideration of all the other evidence in the case.130 Addition-
ally, where the defendant claimed that when he shot his wife he was
under the control of a pernicious spirit, there was no entitlement to
ask whether the prospective jurors believed that a spirit can manipu-
late a person to do its desires.131 Nor may the prosecutor inquire as to
whether jurors believe that "people have a natural impulse to confess
their wrongdoings.' '1 32
The rationale underlying rejection of the types of questions taken
from the foregoing decisions is that they improperly tend to highlight
aspects of the case rather than expose bias.133 Inquiries such as those
discussed do not advance the objectives of voir dire, for the essential
purpose of the voir dire examination is to select a fair and impartial
jury.134 As the courts have instructed, voir dire is not to be used as a
means of pre-educating or indoctrinating a jury or as a means of im-
paneling a jury with particular predispositions. 35 The purpose of voir
dire is to "filter out prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to
be impartial,"' 36 and Rule 431 places no limitations or restrictions
upon counsels' right to achieve this result. Predictably, the law in this
area will continue to develop, especially so given counsel's mandated
opportunity personally to participate in the voir dire process. As a
consequence, trial judges increasingly will be called upon to rule upon
the sort of factual inquiries noted herein and the reviewing courts in-
evitably will continue to redefine and shape the contours of permissi-
ble voir dire.
Addressing a final area of potential concern, were one to be capable
of prediction, it is doubtful that the advent of the new rule will allow
128. People v. Nicholson, 377 N.E.2d 1063, 1068 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978).
129. People v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1056-57 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
130. People v. Chamness, 473 N.E.2d 476, 478-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
131. People v. Uppole, 591 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
132. People v. Bell, 505 N.E.2d 365, 372 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
133. People v. Pope, 486 N.E.2d 350, 356 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
134. People v. Seuffer, 582 N.E.2d 71, 78 (I11. 1991).
135. Pope, 486 N.E.2d at 356.
136. People v. Oliver, 637 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
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the wheels of justice to grind any faster, or for that matter, more
smoothly. What is more likely is that the voir dire process will pit the
court against counsel, each intent on preserving their perceived pre-
rogatives. Trial judges, in adhering to the long-standing pronounce-
ments of the reviewing courts, will endeavor to confine the
examination to its accepted purpose of insuring the selection of a fair
and impartial jury and predictably will resist any efforts by counsel to
tread the forbidden waters of pre-education or indoctrination of ju-
rors. 137 Conversely, most trial lawyers who are worth their salt will
continue to be imbued with the philosophy that indoctrination is very
much a part and parcel of jury selection, a position long championed
by well respected commentators on trial advocacy. 138
A cursory examination of the treatises and articles reflects wide-
spread acceptance of the proposition that persuasion is a legitimate
aspect of jury selection. The primary goal of persuasion, as its propo-
nents stress, is to influence potential jurors to adopt the perspective of
the case that the lawyer advocates. 139 Trial lawyers are counseled to
focus on the advocacy purpose of voir dire by using it to begin the
process of persuading the jurors that counsel's position is correct. 140
In criminal cases, this means that counsel is urged to educate jurors as
to the merits of the defense position while they diffuse the prosecu-
tor's case. 14
1
137. People v. Cloutier, 622 N.E.2d 774, 781 (I11. 1993) ("[Vloir dire cannot, however, be used
as an opportunity to even slightly indoctrinate a juror."); People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303,
1309 (I11. 1986); People v. Mapp, 670 N.E.2d 852, 860 (I11. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Bommer-
sbach, 593 N.E.2d 783, 786 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
138. 3 MELVIN M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 51.42 (2d ed. 1982) ("Voir dire of the prospective
panel should be used to accomplish two purposes: first, the excusing or striking of unfavorable
prospective jurors; and second, the opportunity to meet and impress those who will become the
'triers of facts' with the justiciableness of one's cause.") Id. See FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAW AND
TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS, § 85 (1949); IRVING GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 240 (1935); Jo-
seph P. Carr, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: An Appraisal by an Attorney, 1963 U. ILL. L.F.
653, 653; Clarence W. Heyl, Selection of the Jury, 40 ILL. B.J. 328, 337 (1952).
139. See, e.g., JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 4 (1995):
The primary goal of persuasion during voir dire is to influence potential jurors to adopt
the perspective of the case that the lawyer advocates. By doing so early in the trial
process, jurors filter the evidence and arguments made at trial through the lens of the
lawyer's viewpoint. This filtering process subsequently makes the opposing lawyer's
job that much more difficult.
Id.
140. MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, TRIAL TECHNIQUE AND EVIDENCE 42 (1995).
141. See, e.g., 2 F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL TECHNIQUES
§ 39:21 (1994).
As you interrogate the jurors you meet them personally for the first time. You are
given a chance to start selling them your defense. Your questions should educate each
prospective juror as to the legal principles of your defense, thereby helping them to
understand the legalistic jargon of the court's charge. Their answers to your questions
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From defense counsel's standpoint, the reality of the situation is
that indoctrination is pervasive in our criminal justice system. Very
early in their careers counsel become schooled in the belief that indoc-
trination begins well before the jurors are summoned, generated by
the deluge of media accounts of crime which cause jurors to harbor
concerns for individual and family safety. Counsel surmise that this
indoctrination has already taken its toll by the time the jurors enter
the courthouse, many of them believing that the defendants would not
be there unless they were a little guilty. 142 The process continues as
the prospective jurors witness the unsettling spectacle of sheriffs
searching litigants, witnesses, and spectators who enter the building as
well as the jurors themselves, and is compounded from the videotapes,
pamphlets or other visual aids employed to acquaint the jurors with
the functions and responsibilities of jury service. In the defense
psyche, the media indoctrination, the constant presence of security,
and the martial shepherding of jurors in and out of courtrooms are
factors that must be addressed and countered. The voir dire examina-
tion has come to be recognized as a legitimate method of neutralizing
those factors and to humanize the defendant in the eyes of the
jurors. 143
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are hardly likely to have much
quarrel with the subliminal trappings of indoctrination that plague the
defense. Jurors who are cognizant of their surroundings and mindful
of their position as keepers of the community's conscience are viewed
as being better able to do what is expected of them by signing a guilty
verdict. The prosecution has little incentive to dispel the notion that
defendants would not be brought to trial unless they were guilty of
something. The inevitable result is that prosecutors will routinely con-
tinue to align themselves with the court in resisting defense efforts to
educate and indoctrinate prospective jurors. Viewed in this perspec-
tive, the rather conflicting philosophies of the prosecution and the de-
fense are likely to insure that the voir dire examination will require
trial judges to maintain a vigilant eye.
may be effectively used in your summation; you argue that each answer is in reality a
promise.
Id.
142. 1 ELISSA KRAUSS & BETH BONORA, JURYWORK § 2.04(2)(a) (1997). "Attitudinal
surveys conducted by the National Jury Project in jurisdictions throughout the country reveal
that a substantial proportion of persons eligible for jury service: -agree that a person who is
brought to trial is probably guilty .... Id.
143. Cathy E. Bennett et al., How to Conduct a Meaningful & Effective Voir Dire in Criminal
Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 659, 674-76 (1992).
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III. SOME SUGGESTIONS TO PRACTITIONERS
While it is recognized that the nature and extent of the voir dire will
be defined generally by the charges and the relevant aspects of the
case on trial, there are nonetheless some basic observations and cave-
ats that may be of some value to those who lack extensive exposure to
the processes of jury selection. The observations and suggestions that
follow are based upon the experiences of the author as well as some
fellow jurists.' 44
A starting point to consider is the appropriate situs of the examina-
tion, for in some cases there may be compelling reasons for con-
ducting the voir dire of each juror individually and outside the
presence of the other prospective jurors. Although the courts do not
recognize any right to sequestered voir dire, either in capital cases 145
or in cases involving controversial defenses, 146 trial judges in their dis-
cretion, may allow the examination to be conducted in this fashion. 47
Some judges have been receptive to such requests, particularly where
the jurors' responses might tend to educate other members of the ve-
nire as to what would constitute an acceptable or good answer, or
would otherwise taint the panel. Sequestered voir dire has been the
practice routinely followed by this author in proceedings involving the
death penalty, high profile media cases, the insanity defense, and
where defendants claim entitlement to justifiable use of deadly force
against assaults by peace officers. The rationale for conducting the
voir dire in this manner is that some jurors may have apprehensions
which cause them to be reticent in providing the full and truthful an-
swers called for, perhaps fearing embarrassment before their fellow
jurors.
Lawyers who have participated in jury selection recognize that the
process begins well before the venire is summoned to the courtroom.
Depending upon the issues, the evidence, and other aspects of the
case, prosecutors and defense counsel alike generally have a pretty
good picture of the jurors they are seeking before the trial begins.
From the prosecutor's standpoint the ideal juror might likely be a
steadily employed blue collar worker, possessing traditional family
values and having strong ties to the community. State's attorneys tend
144. To date, the author has presided over 245 jury trials in which he has had the practice to
meet with jurors after the verdict to discuss any unusual or bothersome aspects of their service.
Additionally, as an attorney, the author served as trial counsel in nearly 100 felony cases wherein
the former practice of attorney-conducted voir dire was followed.
145. People v. Neal, 489 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ill. 1985).
146. People v. Seuffer, 582 N.E.2d 71, 78 (I11. 1991).
147. Neal, 489 N.E.2d at 852.
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to look favorably upon individuals who are politically conservative
and authoritarian in nature, who will respond well to the notion that
the prosecutor represents the "legitimate authority of the state and
society," and who will be more likely to view the defendant as a social
nonconformist. 148 The state hopes to select jurors who exhibit a will-
ingness to judge others, while they themselves follow the law, and who
demonstrate that they will be able to work together in arriving at a
verdict. 149 Defense counsel, on the other hand, generally are recep-
tive to professional or white collar employment which requires analyt-
ical skills, and to mental health, pastoral, or social workers whose
occupations might denote an acceptance of and concern for those less
fortunate than themselves. Defense counsel might well look for jurors
who exhibit personality traits that demonstrate a dislike for unfairness
or inequity.150
The literature on trial advocacy and practice is also instructive on
jury selection practices. Much of it is stereotypical in approach, some
current and some dated. For example, defense counsel are cautioned
that retired police officers and military personnel as well as their
spouses are undesirable since their professional life has required ad-
herence to a strict line of conduct. 151 Similarly, defense lawyers are
told that bankers, bank employees, and low salaried white collar
workers have been trained to either take or to give orders and have
been forced to tow the line and usually expect others to do the
same.1 52 Conversely, salespersons, actors, artists, and writers are said
to be highly desirable for the defense as "[t]hey tend to accept life
more readily," "are not easily shocked by a crime," and require more
evidence of guilt before voting to convict. 53
The stereotypical approach traditionally has extended to ethnic and
racial considerations as well, although these concerns understandably
were of greater significance when venires were composed of a first or
second generation citizenry. From a defense standpoint, the teaching
was that persons of Irish, Italian, Jewish, or Southern European ex-
traction were more desirable than those of British, German, or Scan-
dinavian heritage. 54 The view was that the latter were presumed to
be more law abiding, conservative, and strict, and that they possessed
148. FREDERICK, supra note 139, at 13-14.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id. at 16-17.
151. BAILEY & FISHMAN, supra note 141, § 39:49.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at § 39:47
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more rigid standards of conduct.155 According to some commenta-
tors, even physical characteristics are of significance to defense coun-
sel. "Generally speaking, the heavy, roundfaced, jovial-looking
person is the most desirable. The undesirable juror is quite often the
slight, underweight, and sharp-featured type. ' 156
The stereotypical approach to jury selection, while more prevalent
in days past, continues to be utilized in some quarters. However,
more recent literature is likely to look more favorably upon the scien-
tific approach to jury selection which has been adopted and employed
by attorneys where economically feasible.1 57 The scientific approach
entails the use of trial consultants, who generally have backgrounds in
the social sciences, to provide systematic assessments of juror charac-
teristics in hopes of predicting juror behavior.158 From the issues and
the evidence anticipated, the consultants attempt to draw a composite
of the ideal juror for the case by compiling lists of character traits
desired and not desired.1 59 They are also present in the courtroom
during the voir dire and assist in evaluating the prospective jurors as
they are observed and questioned. 60 Although cost considerations
generally will render the talents of jury consultants unavailable to
both prosecutors and defense counsel, their approach and methodol-
ogy no doubt has been utilized by practitioners routinely over the
years.
Regardless of whether the lawyer employs the stereotypical or sci-
entific approach to jury selection, the juror's family, employment his-
tory, and general background will aid in furnishing meaningful
predictions as to the juror's attitudes, interaction with fellow jurors,
and the likelihood of reaching a favorable decision. In gaining that
knowledge, at least in Cook County, attorneys routinely begin their
examination with the juror cards that provide the basic information
for each prospective juror. While some may view the cards in a name,
rank, and serial number fashion, there is a good deal more that pro-
vides some basic insights into the juror's background. From the cards,
lawyers will acquire information concerning the juror's family; resi-
dence; employer and occupation; prior jury service; relationships with
judges, lawyers, and police; prior involvement in the criminal justice
155. Id.
156. Id. § 39:44.
157. See, e.g., Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Explanatory Study of its
Content and Effect, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 489 n.2 (1994).
158. Id.
159. BELLI, supra note 138, § 51.82.
160. Id.
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system as complainants, witnesses, or defendants; and whether the ju-
ror or family member has been a victim.
There are, of course, subsidiary areas of inquiry that counsel may
wish to pursue depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
For instance, prior military service might be a relevant concern to as-
certain familiarity with handguns or explosives, involvement in court
martial proceedings, or perhaps service as a military policeman or
prison guard. Casual pursuits and hobbies or participation in activities
such as hunting, target shooting, martial arts, survival training, or
other endeavors could also be revealing. Further insight into the ju-
rors' makeup may be gleaned from membership in particular clubs,
groups, or associations. Individuals who belong to the National Rifle
Association or who participate in the activities of CAPS (Chicago Al-
ternative Policing Strategy) present themselves quite differently than,
say, dues paying members of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Coalition Against the Death Penalty, or some similarly oriented
group. Counsel may also wish to learn something about how the ju-
rors acquire their news, as for example through newspaper or periodi-
cal subscriptions. A juror who subscribes to The American Spectator
or The National Review will justifiably be viewed in a different light
than one who routinely reads The Progressive or The Atlantic
Monthly. Although each juror need not be asked the same identical
questions, enough information should be obtained to enable counsel
to interpose intelligent challenges.
In today's setting, counsel must also be mindful of Batson161 consid-
erations and glean sufficient knowledge from the prospective jurors to
support or oppose claims of racial,162 ethnic, 163 or gender a64 discrimi-
nation. The principles enunciated in the context of claims of racial
discrimination clearly apply in cases involving ethnic discrimination
165
as well as gender discrimination.1 66 Counsel should take heed that
when Batson motions are interposed, one of the factors courts may
consider in determining whether the movant has made a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination is whether the excluded persons are
"a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common character-
161. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). In Batson, the court held that the prosecu-
tion is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from challenging prospective jurors solely
based on their race. Id. at 97.
162. Id. at 96-97.
163. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991).
164. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994).
165. People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 698 (Ill. 1989); People v. Mahaffey, 539 N.E.2d 1172,
1184 (I11. 989).
166. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358.
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istic."167 It is, therefore, incumbent upon opposing counsel to elicit
enough meaningful information to enable the court to find that there
are valid distinguishing factors present other than the forbidden one.
This is likewise true during the second stage of the hearing where the
burden has shifted to require the party justifying the challenge to offer
a race neutral explanation of why the particular juror is objectiona-
ble. 68 The subject of race or gender neutral explanations has been
amply covered elsewhere, and it is not the purpose here to broaden
that coverage. Suffice it to say that when recognition is given to fac-
tors that have been accepted as race neutral, such as employment, 169
residence170 or political philosophy,171 counsel's role in obtaining suf-
ficient data is readily apparent.
Some cautions are advisable. First, when conducting voir dire,
counsel should refrain from placing on record a juror's residence or
work address, as many jurors harbor concerns that reprisals may result
from a verdict adverse to the defense. To alleviate such concerns
many judges also routinely instruct defense counsel to refrain from
exhibiting the juror cards to the defendant or to allow them to be
otherwise accessible. In those limited cases involving pro se represen-
tation, as a general practice, the cards simply are not given to either
side. Second, in the case of prior arrests or convictions, it is not unu-
sual to discover a conflict between the juror's card and criminal back-
ground information which has been obtained by the prosecution and
hopefully tendered to the defense. Care should be taken to phrase the
question with such certainty as to allow for a challenge for cause if the
deception is apparent, because the juror cards simply ask whether the
juror has been an "accused." Also, although not required by case
law, 72 it may be preferable in those situations to request an in camera
hearing to avoid the possibility of embarrassment to the juror as to the
correctness of their background information.
Juror embarrassment is definitely a factor to be considered and
counsel should be mindful that prospective jurors indeed have a zone
of privacy which judges will endeavor to protect. Reference has al-
ready been made to residence and work addresses, but there are other
areas as well. Even before the supreme court mandated attorney voir
dire, judges witnessed many intrusions into this zone for no apparent
167. People v. Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 782, 786 (I11. 1996).
168. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380-86 (111. 1989).
169. People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 399 (Ill. 1995); People v. Kitchen, 636 N.E.2d 433, 442
(I11. 1994).
170. People v. Andrews, 614 N.E.2d 1184, 1193 (I11. 1993).
171. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380-81 (I11. 1989).
172. People v. Smith, 604 N.E.2d 858, 876 (Ill. 1992).
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purpose, serving only to pry into personal matters or otherwise em-
barrass the juror. For example, asking a young woman whether she
lives alone or with her boyfriend may likely cause her embarrassment,
particularly if she does not have a boyfriend or even desires one, or
may compel her to announce before a body of assembled strangers
that she is a single women living alone. Likewise objectionable are
efforts to root out what counsel may perceive to be the juror's ethnic-
ity or background by asking: "What kind of name is that?" One at-
torney, perhaps thinking she was complimenting a juror rather than
patronizing her, tried this approach: "That's an interesting and lovely
accent you have; where were you born?" Her chagrin was justified
when the juror with some trace of annoyance replied: "Chicago."
While asking a juror to name the last biography he read might provide
a history professor with the opportunity to expound upon his literary
endeavors, the same question put to a streets and sanitation worker is
more likely to be greeted with dismay. Judges also view with disap-
proval questions that seek to probe jurors' feelings on a myriad of
subjects; for example, "whether [prior jury service] left them 'with any
prejudices or cynicism regarding the judicial system," 173 or, as in the
trial of John Wayne Gacy, their feelings about homosexuals.
174
Although these types of questions may provide interesting answers
and reveal rather divergent views, they may also anesthetize or offend
the venire rather than enlighten the court and counsel.
1 75
In fashioning questions to be asked, counsel should be mindful that
even before the advent of amended Rule 431, trial judges generally
gave opening statements to the venire introducing the attorneys and
the accused, and informing the jurors of the fundamental principles
governing the trial. As previously noted, the new rule now mandates
that the court acquaint prospective jurors with their general duties
and responsibilities. 176 It might behoove counsel to use those opening
remarks as a prelude to further inquiry; that is, to "play-off" or use the
judge's comments as a springboard in fashioning counsel's questions.
This technique may have a two-fold benefit, for counsel is likely to
avoid the objection of misstating some general proposition already ar-
173. People v. Washington, 432 N.E.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
174. See Gacy v. Welbourn, 994 F.2d 305, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1993), where the trial judge asked
whether the jurors could put aside any feelings they might have regarding homosexuality in
rendering their verdict, but declined to ask the jurors to describe their feelings about homosexu-
als. Id. The Seventh Circuit recognized that "[t]o do more would have extended the jury-selec-
tion process considerably and left many jurors flustered and resentful, which in the end may
have worked against the defendant." Id. at 315.
175. Id. at 315.
176. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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ticulated by the judge and the practice may also serve to ally counsel
with the court in the eyes of the jurors. Even where the judge makes
no opening statements, reference to the introductory video or juror
pamphlets, where such materials are used, may provide a basis for
following up on general principles.
Lawyers should also take care to insure that the questions put to
prospective jurors are procedurally correct and conform to the princi-
ple encompassed in the inquiry. For example, counsel is clearly enti-
tled to ask jurors whether they will act upon the presumption of
innocence and give their client the benefit of it in considering the evi-
dence. 177 However, asking jurors if they can start the trial believing
the defendant is innocent is something more than a semantical distinc-
tion, for it clearly misstates the law. Although a defendant has the
right to ascertain whether jurors will follow the presumption of inno-
cence, there is no right to have jurors who have a present belief that
he indeed is innocent. 178 Nor, of course, is there any requirement that
the State prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
Similarly, some attorneys assume that the opportunity to personally
question carries with it the right to extract commitments from the ju-
rors as to how they will act or, even more objectionably, how they will
vote. This is likely to occur in high profile cases involving, for exam-
ple, people such as the El Rukn leader Jeff Fort tried before this au-
thor. Although Fort had acquired considerable media notoriety, the
reviewing court determined that his attorney had no right to have the
jurors promise that they could "completely put aside anything [they
had] read or heard about the defendant. ' 179 Counsel may also run
afoul of controlling precedent by asking a juror how he or she would
decide the case based upon certain assumptions stated in a hypotheti-
cal question. 180 Questions such as these, which attempt to obtain a
pledge from the juror as to what the verdict would be, have long been
deemed improper. 181 The same rationale applies where counsel fo-
177. People v. Redola, 133 N.E. 292, 294 (I11. 1921).
178. Id. at 293 (rejecting the question: "[I]f you should be selected as a juror, can you start out
on a trial of this case believing the defendant is innocent?").
179. People v. Fort, 618 N.E.2d 445, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
180. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 678 N.E.2d 358, 363-64 (I11. App. Ct. 1997) (rejecting the
state's use of hypothetical questions concerning identification, finding that such hypotheticals
were an attempt to indoctrinate the jury).
181. People v. Robinson, 132 N.E. 803, 804 (I11. 921). Here, defense counsel's question was
more in the nature of a summation:
The prosecuting witness may appear to be an elderly white lady who may have parted
with various sums of money, and it may develop that this defendant received this
money and that she had not received any part of the money back, and she entered into
an obligation with this defendant by which she expected to receive large returns for the
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cuses upon a single piece of evidence such as descriptions, handguns,
or the like with the aim of getting some prior commitment as to how
the juror will view the assumed evidence. And it is also improper for
counsel to attempt to ferret out how jurors, during deliberations,
would allow the fact that they were in the minority influence them in
reaching their verdict.18 2 Such inquiry is objectionable for the reason
that it could be interpreted as "suggesting that a juror's position upon
the question of a verdict should be unchanging."'1 83 Jurors clearly
have the duty to reconsider their initial impressions and the right to
change their minds. 184
Lastly, but significantly, trial counsel should be mindful of the
teaching that establishing and maintaining juror rapport is a recog-
nized goal of jury selection. 185 Lawyers establish rapport in numerous
ways which may include treating jurors with respect, showing interest
in them as individuals, and making them feel comfortable. 186 Jury tri-
als are stressful events for court and counsel and this is likewise true
of jury service. Receipt of a jury summons is hardly a harbinger of
great joy in the minds of the rank and file citizenry.
Lawyers, because of their education and background, perhaps un-
wittingly may conduct the voir dire in a manner that undermines or
defeats the goal of rapport. One objectionable feature of attorney
voir dire apparent to most trial judges is the lawyer's practice of liter-
ally exhausting the patience of each juror through what is perceived as
a comprehensive examination, but in reality is a rather boring and
tiresome dialogue. Lawyers who selected jurors when attorney voir
dire was the rule came to recognize that "a prolonged examination
usually works to their detriment and to the detriment of their client's
interests."'1 87 Suffice it to say that each juror need not be asked the
same routine questions. 88 Needless repetition is not only time-con-
suming, but is also unnecessary and frankly boring to the venire. In
some situations less may be better. For example, there is little to be
gained by asking a hod carrier about his educational background and
money that she advanced, and if you are satisfied that this defendant did receive this
money, but the criminal intent to defraud her by making representations that are false,
and he had knowedge of the falsity, if the state fails to show that this is the truth, would
you by your verdict find this defendant not guilty?
Id.
182. People v. Dukett, 308 N.E.2d 590, 597 (I11. 1974).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. FREDERICK, supra note 139, at 3.
186. Id.
187. Max E. Wildman, Selection and Examination of Jurors, 5 DEPAUL L. REV. 32, 33 (1955).
188. BAILEY & FISHMAN, supra note 141, § 39:27; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 138, § 249.
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it may be embarrassing as well. Similarily, it is doubtful that asking a
college student about her military experiences would in any way be
beneficial. Simply put, specific inquiry should be tailored to the par-
ticular juror with the aim of culling out an experience, trait, or view-
point that is either positive or negative in the mind of the examiner.
Another objectionable practice is the tendency of some attorneys to
use the voir dire as a means of honing their skills at cross-examination.
In the vast majority of cases this simply is a mistake, for the conven-
tional wisdom is that one should not cross examine a juror.189 Not
only will the relation between counsel and juror become strained but
also it will likely antagonize and offend fellow jurors who witness this
spectacle. The resulting bias that inevitably inures to the attorney will
surely defeat the objective of rapport desired.
Lawyers who exhibit undue familiarity with prospective jurors is an-
other practice to be avoided. Although we have been conditioned to
expect this from sales personnel and telecommunicators whom we
have never laid eyes upon, few judges subscribe to the belief that a
prospective juror may be referred to as "John" or asked: "Mrs. Smith,
do you mind if I call you Mary?" Approaches like these will do little
to establish the rapport desired by counsel.
These are examples of just some of the things judges take notice of;
there are no doubt many others. Attorneys need not have had exten-
sive experience in jury selection to avoid these pitfalls as common
sense alone would seem to dictate a recognition that the lawyer is on
trial before the jury as much as the client.
CONCLUSION
In the course of this article the first focus of attention was upon the
history and evolution of voir dire practices in Illinois. From that dis-
cussion, it should be apparent to the reader that judicial policy works
in mysterious and perhaps unusual ways. The end result in this case,
of course, is that the clock has been turned back to an earlier more
permissive era when counsel was afforded the opportunity to person-
ally participate in the processes of jury selection. That opportunity,
however, was not unbridled in the past, nor will it be so now. Rather,
the conduct and control of the voir dire will remain subject to the
discretion of the trial judge, as indeed it must.
The foreseeable problematic areas are not, for the most part, new
concerns; rather, they are a continuation of what we have exper-
ienced. As demonstrated, some problematic areas, such as the prohi-
189. 2 ANNE F. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS § 14.23 (1985).
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bition against inquiry concerning matters law or instructions, have
have been visited with some degree of regularity in the past. This is
likewise so regarding the rather conflicting decisions dealing with the
practice of making factual inquiries. Zehr concerns have also been
addressed by the reviewing courts and in all likelihood will continue to
be an area of appellate focus.
Practitioners hopefully will not minimize or overlook the signifi-
cance of what has been accomplished at the Illinois Supreme Court's
direction. What the court has done is to provide the criminal bar with
the means to conduct a meaningful and effective examination of pro-
spective jurors, an objective long sought by experienced practitioners,
a quest now realized. Hopefully, trial lawyers will seize upon this op-
portunity to insure that the legitimate objects of voir dire are realized,
while at the same time promoting the interests of their client most
advantageously. Given that the new rule has been operative for only
a brief pause of legal history, the jury is still out on how counsel will
adapt to this resurrected power. It is hoped that those who have
taken the time and effort to suffer through this article will come away
with a better understanding of the voir dire process as we have come
to know it, and be cognizent of the benefits as well as the possible
pitfalls that may lay ahead.
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